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1915(d) and the Appointment of Counsel in Civil Cases
I. INTRODUCTION
At a time when the need for legal services among the poor is growing more
critical, and public funding for such services has not kept pace, the power of the
federal courts to compel lawyers to take indigent cases against their will has
developed into an obvious, yet heavily criticized, solution. In the midst of this
atmosphere, the United States Supreme Court recently decided the issue, long
unresolved in the lower federal courts, of whether a federal district court pos-
sesses the authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) to coerce unwilling attorneys to
accept pro bono appointments in civil cases.1 Although counsels' duty to serve,
and courts' authority to require service, is an amalgamation of historical tradi-
tion, ethical obligation, and the requirements imposed by in forma pauperis
statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), such a duty is, in fact, "shrouded in
obscurity, ambiguity, and qualification, and this murkiness is reflected in recent
struggles of courts. . . to deal rationally with these issues."' From the noncon-
senting lawyer's perspective, the imposition of such a duty by the courts raises
legitimate constitutional issues and policy questions, which must be balanced
against the needs of indigent litigants to obtain access to the courts and the
bar's ethical duty to ensure that access. This Note will address these issues in
the context of the Supreme Court's recent attempt, in Mallard v. United States
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, to reconcile the split among
the lower courts-if only temporarily. The following Part of this Note will pro-
vide a historical background of the lawyer's duty of representation and the
court's authority to compel such service, which served as a basis for Congress
codifying this obligation in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). In Part III, this Note will
survey the lower courts' interpretations of Section 1915(d), and offer some ex-
planation for their disagreement. Part IV will focus on the Supreme Court's
treatment of Section 1915(d) as presented to it in the Mallard case. Finally, in
Part V, this Note will explore numerous public policy and constitutional issues
left untouched by the Court in Mallard, and offer some proposed solutions to
guide courts in the future.
1. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989). See also Pro Bono Work - Appointment
by Court - 28 U.S.C. 1915(d), 57 U.S.L.W. 3611 (Mar. 21, 1989).
2. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyers' Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L Ray. 735, 738 (1980).
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF AN ATTORNEY'S DUTY TO SERVE
A. Historical Origins
Scholars and commentators generally agree that a system of mandatory
public service is an ancient tradition of the legal profession dating back as early
as fifteenth-century England. Although there exists no historical support for
compelling an attorney to volunteer a fixed amount of time, it is clear that law-
yers have long been willing to furnish such services without pay, and most
courts will compel them to do so if they refuse.3
This English tradition has been the foundation upon which the American
law was built; and while the early English common law has evolved into an
independent and autonomous body of American law, American courts still rely
on the law's historical roots. Thus, the historical recognition that the early Eng-
lish courts had the authority to compel an attorney to represent an indigent is
frequently invoked to support the use of a similar power by courts in the United
States. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Dillon,4 pro-
vided a notable example of the extent to which the judiciary has relied on this
tradition to establish its control over the bar. There, the court noted the early
English practice, whereby "serjeants-at-law [sic] 'from a very early period...
might be required by any of these courts to plead for a poor man.' "" The court
also recognized "the commitment of the lawyer to serve upon court assignment
was put in unequivocal terms . . . by Chief Justice Hale, who stated that 'if the
Court should assign [a serjeant] [sic] to be counsel, he ought to attend; and if
he refuse . . . we would not hear him, nay, we would make bold to commit
him.' "6 Thus, it is evident that the English legal system developed a practice
whereby counsel was obligated to serve, and the courts could require, by threat
of sanction, such services.
The earliest-formed obligation of counsel was merely a creature of common
law.7 The earliest evidence of a statutory duty dates back to the latter fifteenth
century; however, it was not until the seventeenth century that a statute embod-
ied the present-day conception of mandatory representation. The Statute of
Henry VII, enacted in 1695, and which remained in effect until 1883, gave the
courts authority to compel:
learned counsel ... for the preparation of suits without any reward taking therefore;
and after the said writ or writs be returned, if it be afore the king in his bench, thejustices there shall assign to the same poor person or persons, counsel learned ...
which shall give their counsels, nothing taking for the same: and likewise the justices
shall appoint attorney and attornies [sic] for the same poor person or persons ... for
the speed of said suits to be had and made, which shall do their duties without any
reward for their counsels, help and business in the same.8
3. Id.
4. 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
5. Id. at 636 (quoting 2 HoLwswoR'rL A HISTORY OF ENousH LAW, 491 (3d ed. 1923)).
6. Id. (brackets in original).
7. Id.
8. Statutes Made at Westminster, 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 (1495), cited In Dillon, 346 F.2d at 636.
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Although this right was often limited, and could not accurately be understood
to impose a general duty on counsel to provide representation to the indigent, it
nevertheless established the framework on which the American law would take
shape."
In the newly formed colonies, however, there is little evidence that the legal
system sought to adopt the beneficence of its forefathers. This is, in part, attrib-
utable to the fact that there was not a great need of relief for poor civil liti-
gants. The new world provided the colonists with room to expand and to achieve
economic independence. Along with a better standard of living, the colonists
enjoyed access to the courts with little or no fees or costs. This resulted in a
society that was less litigious, and also better equipped to cope with the occa-
sional disputes which eventually arose. It was not until the Civil War, and the
growth of great cities, that the United States would experience "the infinite
complexity of modern life, of business, and of the affairs in general which breed
litigation,"10 causing a corresponding rise in the need for counsel to represent
the growing underclass in society.
By 1892, in response to swelling court dockets, a dozen state legislatures
gave their courts the statutory authority to order lawyers to render assistance to
indigent civil litigants, and there existed the common-law power to appoint or
assign counsel in at least ten others."' Many of the same concerns which moti-
vated the states to act provided the impetus for the United States government's
legislation guaranteeing indigent litigants' access to the federal courts.
B. The In Forma Pauperis Statute: 28 U.S.C. § 1915
It was against this backdrop that Congress, in 1892, enacted a statute
which it titled: "An act providing when plaintiff may sue as a poor person and
when counsel shall be assigned by the court.' 2 Although it appears from the
title of the Act that Congress required counsel's representation, the text of the
Act, which differs in significant respect from its title, raises some doubt. Section
4 of the Act reads, "[t]hat the court may request any attorney of the court to
represent such poor person, if it deems the cause worthy of trial . . .,,13 It is
with the emphasis which should, or should not, be attached to Congress' choice
9. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 739.
10. Maguire, Property and Civil Litigation, 36 HARv. L. Rav. 361, 382. Even though a survey of the nascent
colonies does not reveal a wide-spread recognition of the English tradition of assisting poor litigants, there was
some start along this line. "Massachusetts, for example, in 1642 passed an act referring to admission of parties in
forma pauperis." Id. at 381; CHART.s AND GENERAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, c. 5, § 4, p. 45 (1814).
Whatever the practice in colonial times, at least six of the American states adopted versions of the Statute of
Henry VII in the first thirty years of the republic, including Virginia in 1786, Kentucky in 1798, the Louisiana
Territory in 1807, the Indiana Territory in 1813, and Tennessee in 1821. See Fisch, Coercive Appointments of
Counsel in Civil Cases in Forma Pauperis: An Easy Case Makes Hard Law, 50 Mo. L. REv. 527, 547 (1985).
11. See Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. at 1819 (citing ARK. STAT. § 1053 (1884) (assign);
ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 26, § 3 (1884) (assign); IND. REv. STAT., Vol. 2, pt. 2, ch. 1, Art. 2, § 15 (1892) (assign); KY.
STAT. § 884 (1915) (Act of May 27, 1892) (assign); Mo. Rav. STAT. § 2918 (1889) (assign); NJ. GEN. STAT.,
Vol. 2, Practice § 369, p. 2598 (1896) (assign); 1876 N.Y. LAws, ch. 448, Art. 3, § 460 (assign); 1869 N.C.
PUBuC LAWs, ch. 96, § 2 (assign); TENN. CODE § 3980 (1858) (appoint and assign); Tax. Rav. STAT., Art. 1125
(1879) (appoint); VA. CODE ANN. § 3538 (1849) (assign); W. VA. CODE, ch. 138, § 1 (1897) (assign)).
12. 27 Stat. 252, ch. 209 (1892) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1982)).
13. Id.
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of the word "assign" in the title of the Act, and the word "request" in the text
of the Act itself, that has given rise to confusion over the court's authority to
order a coercive appointment of counsel in civil cases. Did Congress intend the
terms to be synonymous? Or was the choice of verbiage a conscious one, in-
tended to relieve the burden on an attorney who would not be compensated for
his efforts? This Note will attempt to provide an answer to this question
through an analysis of legislative history, and the federal courts' application of
the Act in light of both its purposes and its plain meaning.
Because the language of the Act may be viewed as ambiguous, it is neces-
sary to look elsewhere to determine the scope of a court's authority, and coun-
sels' corresponding duties. To be sure, the Congress that adopted the original in
forma pauperis statute, which is now amended as 28 U.S.C. § 1915, was un-
doubtedly aware of the numerous state appointment of counsel statutes then in
existence that were designed to enable those persons who could not afford legal
representation to avail themselves of the state courts.14 Indeed, it was reported
on the floor of the House of Representatives that, in enacting Section 1915,
Congress intended to open the courts to impoverished litigants and to "keep
pace" with the laws of the "[m]any humane and enlightened [s]tates.' u  Fur-
thermore, a colloquy between representatives in the House evidenced the Con-
gressional intent that "in these cases of charity and humanity [the Congress] is
compelling these officers,16 all of whom make good salaries to do this work for
nothing."'17 Although these limited glimpses into the legislature's intent may not
be conclusive, in the absence of any legislative history to the contrary, these
statements are at least suggestive that Congress sought to follow the example
set by the states.
Viewed in light of the legislation's stated purpose, the representatives'
statements acquire greater importance. In enacting the in forma pauperis stat-
ute, Congress was motivated by its belief that access to the courts should not be
denied "for want- of sufficient money or property."1 8 Concerned with an indi-
gent's inability to tender the necessary filing and attorney's fees, Congress ques-
tioned a policy which effectively allowed the government to close its courts "to
its own citizens, who are conceded to have valid and just rights, because they
happen to be without the money to advance pay the tribunals of justice."' 9 Be-
cause the Act also provided that the court could waive any filing fees and court
14. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1819.
15. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 1079, 52d Cong,, 1st Sess. 1-2 (1892).
16. Debate also exists over the meaning of the term "officers" in the Act. In Section 3, the statute reads "the
officers of court shall issue, serve all process, and perform all duties in such cases." 27 Stat. 252, ch. 209 § 3
(1892). Thus, there is support for the proposition that the act applies only to non-attorney court personnel. In
rebuttal, however the argument is raised that if lower paid non-attorney court personnel can be compelled to serve
without compensation, then certainly better compensated attorneys, who are also bound by traditional ethical
duties, can likewise be compelled to serve.
17. 23 Cong. Rec. 5199 (1892). Further supporting this view of Congressional intent, is the fact that the bill
was introduced on the floor of both the House and Senate as a bill empowering the courts to "assign" counsel for
poor persons. Id. at 6264.
18. H.R. REp. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1892).
19. Id. The legislature's declaration of purpose must be viewed in the context of the ethical-intellectual cli-
mate which existed at the time the statute was proposed. The lawyers' tradition of professional service was best
portrayed by Professor Thomas Cooley, who wrote:
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costs, it could be argued that Congress' statements were only directed to this
provision of the Act and that it did not speak to the necessity of giving a court
the power to appoint counsel. However, such an interpretation ignores the fact
that the waiver of filing fees and court costs merely provides access into the
courtroom itself. In order to advance their interests beyond this limited point,
the indigent must have the assistance of counsel. Certainly, Congress must have
intended to make that access meaningful by authorizing the appointment of
counsel in appropriate cases.2
0
It is apparent that Congress, in ratifying Section 1915, recognized the po-
tential for injustice under the then-current system, and sought to fill this
need-albeit by steps not clearly articulated in the language of the statute. It
must be assumed, however, that if Congress identified a shortcoming in the le-
gal system, it must have intended to cloak the courts with sufficient power to
rectify that problem. Whether or not the Act gave courts authority to compel
an attorney to represent an indigent civil litigant is a question which has contin-
ued to perplex the federal courts throughout the succeeding century.
III. FEDERAL COURTS' ANALYSIS OF SECTION 1915(d)
A. Early Judicial Interpretation
Often the decisions of a court, which functioned as a contemporary of the
Congress which enacted an ambiguous statute, can be most telling as to how
that statute should be interpreted.2 1 Although not always conclusive as to the
statute's proper application, the federal judges of the early 1900s, most likely
imbued with the same values and beliefs as their counterparts in Congress, may
have been more capable than their current brethren of interpreting the meaning
of Section 1915(d).
[T]he humanity of the law has provided that, if the prisoner is unable to employ counsel, the court may
designate some one to defend him who shall be paid by the government; but when no such provision is
made, it is a duty which counsel so designated owes to his profession, and to the court engaged in the trial,
and to the cause of. . .justice, not to withhold his... best exertions, in the defense of one who has the
double misfortune to be stricken by poverty and accused of a crime. No one is at liberty to decline such an
appointment, and few, it is hoped, would be disposed to do so.
T. CooLEY, CoNsTrrunoNAL. LIMTATIONS, 334 (3d ed. 1874). Cooley added, "a court has the right to require the
service, whether compensation is made or not; and that counsel should decline to perform it, for no other reason
that the law does not provide pecuniary compensation, is unfit to be an officer of a court of justice." Id. Although
Cooley's remarks are addressed to counsels' duty in a criminal case, his appeals are made to the laws' "humanity"
and to the lawyers' professional obligation to serve the poor, which, presumably, are not dependent on whether the
representation is being offered in a criminal or civil case.
20. Three possible interpretations have been offered to explain Congress' silence: (1) it was obvious to the
legislature that counsel could be required to serve under a court appointment; (2) counsel was always so willing to
accept court requests that it did not even occur to the legislators that attorneys would ever decline to accept an
appointment; (3) Congress thought it was transparently obvious that counsel could not be coerced into accepting
court appointments. Note, Appointment of Counsel and Section 1915(d): Pauper Privilege and Judicial Discre-
tionary Duty, cited in Brief for Respondent, Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989) (No.
87-1490).
21. Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 671 (1889) (words in a statute must be considered in light of their
intended meaning).
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Only two years after Section 1915 was enacted, a United States District
Court, in Boyle v. Great Northern Railroad,22 held that "by an act of Congress
• . . any citizen of the United States entitled to commence any suit or action in
any court of the United States who is unable, by reason of poverty, to prepay
fees . . . may have process and all the rights of other litigants, and may have
counsel assigned to represent him, free of charge." 23 Such a conclusion relies on
the premise that without the assistance of counsel, providing indigents access to
the courts would be a hollow promise.
Similarly, in 1898, a lower federal court, in Whelan v. Manhattan Rail-
way,24 was presented with the opportunity to construe the statute. Again, the
court held that in order to make meaningful an indigent's day in court, Section
1915(d) required that the litigant not only "be relieved from securing the costs
of his adversary, but an attorney is to be provided for him by the court, who will
prosecute his cause of action without stipulating for some compensation in the
event of success." 5 The court continued, "[t]he attorney assigned by the court,
in the event of nonsuccess, will, of course, receive nothing." 26 Although the
court did not appoint counsel in this case, the decision does not imply that the
court lacked the necessary power, but demonstrated only that the exercise of
that power was discretionary.
Likewise, in Brinkley v. Louisville & Nashville Railway, the court once
more interpreted Section 1915(d) as empowering a court to assign counsel if it
deems the cause worthy.28 More significant, however, is that the court traced
the origin of Section 1915 back to the Statute of Henry VII,29 and used the
ancient statute to guide its interpretation of the scope of Section 1915(d). Thus,
the line drawn between the words "request" and "appoint" became difficult to
resolve when viewed from the perspective of the long-established tradition of
service demanded by the courts.
Finally, in United States ex rel. Randolph v. Ross, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that "an impecunious plaintiff, with a meritorious cause of ac-
tion, is not necessarily limited to the employment of an attorney by private con-
tract; for by [Section 1915(d)] the trial court is expressly empowered to assign
an attorney to represent such plaintiff."30 Admittedly, the court's reading of
Section 1915 strains the literal translation of that provision, because Congress
had not expressly conferred such authority on the courts. But in 1892, the legal
22. Boyle v. Great N. Ry., 63 F. 539 (C.C.E.D. Wash. 1894).
23. Id. at 539 (emphasis added).
24. Whelan v. Manhattan Ry., 86 F. 219 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1898).
25. Id. at 220.
26. Id. at 220-21 (emphasis added). The court also refers, in other portions of its opinion, to the ability of the
court to "provide an attorney to represent the poor person," and that an attorney "will be assigned to represent
plaintiff." Id.
27. The court also noted that attorneys in such cases could expect payment only if their clients were success-
ful, and seemed to recognize a lawyer's right to withdraw from the case if he did not agree with those terms. In
that case, the court "will find some other attorney to prosecute the case." Id. at 221.
28. Brinkley v. Louisville & N. Ry., 95 F. 345, 353 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1899).
29. Statutes Made at Westminster, I1 Hen. 7 c.12, which reads in pertinent part, "the justices shall assign
the same poor persons counsel learned. . . and shall appoint attorneys for the same poor persons." Id.
30. United States ex rel. Randolph v. Ross, 298 F. 64, 66 (6th Cir. 1924).
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profession's perception of itself reflected a "strong duty to serve the court in
administering justice to the poor;" therefore, the decision may be viewed as an
attempt to uphold the ideals the profession had come to embody.3'
These four decisions are representative of how the federal courts, at the
turn of the century, interpreted the scope of Section 1915(d). In fact, during the
first forty years after Section 1915(d) was enacted, every federal court decision
construing that section used the word "assign" or "appoint" to describe the
court's authority over counsel.32 Given Congress' and the federal courts' in-
terchangable use of "request" and "assign," it appears inconsequential that the
word "request," rather than "assign" was used in the Act itself.33 Instead, as
these decisions demonstrate, the word was consistently construed so as to ad-
vance the underlying purpose of the Act.
B. Modern Judicial Interpretation
Much of the confusion obscuring the intended meaning of Section 1915(d)
was produced by judicial decision-making in the past forty years. Unlike deci-
sions of the previous forty years, the modern judiciary has not been able to
reach a consensus as to the proper construction of "request" as used in Section
1915(d). The lack of coherence in the courts' reasoning is undoubtedly attribu-
table, in part, to the fact that their decisions are no longer taking place in the
contextual period of the statute's origin. Beyond this general impediment, how-
ever, other factors have been advanced to account for modern courts'
confusion.14
First, the overwhelming majority of motions for counsel in federal courts
seek to have counsel "appointed." Therefore, the federal courts have grown ac-
customed to using the language of mandatory appointment of counsel.35 Sec-
ondly, confusion exists because Section 1915(d) motions are seldom successful.
As one court noted, "[a] district court will secure counsel for an indigent civil
litigant under Section 1915(d) only under 'exceptional circumstances,'3 6 so
31. Brief for Respondent, Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989) (No. 87-1490).
32. Other cases interpreting Section 1915(d) as authorizing a court to appoint counsel include Phillips v.
Louisville & N. Ry., 153 F. 795 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1907), affid 164 F. 1022 (5th Cir. 1908); Adkins v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331 (1948).
33. Further undermining support for the position that Congress, in using the word "request" in Section
1915(d), sought to alleviate the potential burden on attorneys, is the statute's stated purpose, which read: "An act
providing when plaintiff may sue as a poor person and when counsel shall be assigned by the court." 27 Stat. 252
(1892). Since this statute sought primarily to safeguard indigent rights, one scholar has theorized that by using
the word "request" rather than "assign," "Congress may have presumed that pro se litigants might not have even
been aware that courts had authority to appoint counsel. Quite plausibly, the language was intended to urge courts
to make appointments even when the indigent had not specifically asked for counsel." Note, supra note 20.
34. These factors were developed by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d
796 (9th Cir. 1986).
35. 30.64 Acres, 795 F.2d at 799-800. Statutes authorizing appointment of counsel in other circumstances
include: 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982) (criminal); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2245, 2255 (1982) (habeas corpus); Title VII
of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (employment discrimination cases); also under the sixth
amendment, see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S, 458 (1938).
36. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1980); see also United States ex rel. Gardner v. Mad-
den, 352 F.2d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 1965); Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1975); Ehrlich v. Van Epps,
428 F.2d 363, 364 (7th Cir. 1970).
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grants of such a motion are relatively rare."37 Also, because trial judges are
given a great deal of discretion in determining whether counsel is required, ap-
pellate courts are hesitant to reverse lower courts' decisions. As a result, "courts
at both levels often have little incentive to choose their language carefully in
ruling on Section 1915(d) motions; it little matters to a litigant who is denied
counsel whether the court declines to 'appoint' an attorney or merely declines to
Crequest' an attorney to serve."3 8 Lastly, as the court in United States v. 30.64
Acres of Land pointed out, "some of the confusion undoubtedly arises because
the courts use the word 'appoint' in two different senses."3 9 Some courts use the
verb "to appoint" to denote an order for an attorney to represent an indigent
litigant. Other courts, however, use the verb "to appoint" to "designate a pro
bono volunteer attorney as counsel of record for an indigent client."4 In these
cases, the courts understand that the attorney has volunteered to do pro bono
work, and thus issues an order "appointing" counsel in order "to put the attor-
ney-client relationship on a more formal footing." ''
An examination of recent case law reveals that the courts, almost care-
lessly, have used the terms "appoint" and "request" interchangeably. Often,
this is because the court's choice of words has no significant impact on the reso-
lution of the dispute. From counsel's perspective, however, the court's choice of
words is not a distinction without a difference. Presumably, an attorney who is
"requested" to represent an indigent may refuse to honor the request. However,
an attorney who is "appointed" to serve as counsel cannot decline to represent
the indigent in court."2 Unfortunately, the modern judiciary has not shared the
lawyers' concerns, as is evidenced by a bewildering series of opinions interpret-
ing the meaning of Section 1915(d). A survey of recent lower court decisions
will reveal this trend.
1. Narrow Interpretation of Section 1915(d)
A number of federal courts have construed Section 1915(d) narrowly and
have held that the judiciary cannot coerce an unwilling attorney to represent an
indigent litigant in a civil case. For example, in Caruth v. Pinkney,4 the Sev-
enth Circuit rejected a prison inmate's claim that the district court should have
appointed counsel to represent him in his action against various prison offi-
37. 30.64 Acres, 795 F.2d at 799-800.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), which held that "[a]ttorneys are officers of the
court, and are bound to render service when required by. . . appointment." Id. at 73. Although Powell dealt with
the right of counsel in a criminal proceeding, the difficulties attendant to a criminal case are also present in a civil
proceeding, and the denial of counsel would raise concerns in a civil case as well. The Powell majority stated "[i]f
in any case, civil or criminal a. . . court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and
appearing for him, it. . . would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in a constitutional sense."
Id. at 69.
43. Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044 (7th Cir. 1982).
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cials . Although the court recognized that representation of indigents was a
growing concern within the legal community, it placed ,the burden for resolving
this crisis on the shoulders of counsel, and not the courts. The court noted that
it is "the professional obligation of each lawyer to provide public interest ser-
vices," and "[tihe basic responsibility for providing services to those unable to
pay rests upon the individual lawyer."'4
Construing its authority under Section 1915(d), the Caruth court ruled
that it "has the authority only to request an attorney to represent an indigent,
not to require him to do so.' 4 The court realized that this might cause some
hardship-especially where the court has determined that the litigant rightfully
deserved representation. The court emphasized that "we are not unsympathetic
with the burden a district court faces in attempting to secure pro bono counsel,
we merely note that the existence of such a burden will not excuse a court from
attempting" to provide representation in appropriate cases.47 Thus, even though
a court could not command an attorney to represent an indigent, it was not
relieved of its duty to "secure" counsel with whatever power it possessed inde-
pendent of Section 1915(d).
Similarly, in Heidelberg v. Hammer, the same court held that an interpre-
tation of Section 1915(d) merely authorized a court to request an attorney to
represent a party who is proceeding in forma pauperis .' As in Caruth, the
court refused to look beyond the plain language of the statute to effectuate the
purpose of the Act.49
Most recently, in United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, the Ninth Circuit
opined that Section 1915(d) did not authorize the appointment of counsel into
involuntary service. To support its position, the court relied primarily on the
bald language of the statute itself.5 If Congress meant to authorize appoint-
ment, the court rationalized, it would not have used the word "request." The
court argued that in other statutes where Congress felt it was justified to coerce
an attorney to serve, it used the words "appoint" or "assign." 51
The court also noted that if a statute intended to authorize the appoint-
ment of counsel, it often made provision for paying counsel.52 In this case, no
provision had been established to compensate attorneys who were appointed to
represent an indigent under Section 1915(d).53 Presumably, this rationale relies,
in part, on the constitutional argument that requiring counsel to provide services
44. In Caruth, the petitioner attempted to appeal the denial of counsel which he claimed was required by
Section 1915(d); however, the denial of such a motion is not a final and appealable order. The petitioner continued
as a pro se plaintiff, and appealed the denial of the motion for appointment from the trial court's judgment. Id. at
1047, n.2.
45. Caruth, 683 F.2d at 1049. See also AMERICAN BAR AssOcIATION CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY, EC 2-25 (1980).
46. Caruth, 683 F.2d at 1049.
47. Id.
48. Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1978).
49. Id.
50. 30.64 Acres, 795 F.2d at 801.
51. Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (1982); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (1982) (appoint); 42 U.S.C. § 1971(0
(1982) (assignment in contempt proceeding); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S(0(1) (1982) (appointment in Title VII action).
52. 30.64 Acres, 795 F.2d at 801. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (1982).
53. 30.64 Acres, 795 F.2d at 801.
1990] 1009
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
without compensation would amount to a "taking" under the fifth amend-
ment.5' Such a construction of Section 1915(d), or other provisions authorizing
the appointment of counsel, has little support in case law, and has been ex-
pressly rejected by a majority of the circuits.55
Finally, the court contrasted the nature of a civil proceeding with that of a
criminal proceeding to read into Section 1915(d) an absence of authority for a
court to appoint counsel. Based on its premise that there is normally no consti-
tutional right to counsel in a civil proceeding, the court concluded that the fail-
ure of a court to secure counsel "would not normally prejudice the civil liti-
gant's constitutional rights,' 56 and thus Congress must not have intended the
courts to have this power. Although its major premise is sound, there seems to
be a step missing in the Ninth Circuit's logic. Simply because a civil litigant
does not have the constitutional right to counsel does not demand the conclusion
that Congress did not intend for representation to be mandatory. Indeed, Con-
gress has conferred to courts the authority to appoint counsel for indigents in
other noncriminal proceedings.57
Moreover, the perils which confront a pro se litigant in a criminal proceed-
ing are equally -present in a civil litigation. Like a criminal trial, a civil trial is
conducted under technical rules of evidence and procedure, demanding the
same skill in marshalling and preparing facts.58 There is little justification for
drawing such a sharp distinction between poor civil and poor criminal litigants.
In any event, making such a distinction only distracts the courts from the pri-
mary issue. The issue is not the indigent's right to counsel, but the court's au-
thority to ensure indigent's equal access to the legal system.
In light of these considerations, it is doubtful that Congress intended courts
to hold fast to the statute's language when faced with an indigent litigant who is
forced to confront the complex machinery of the legal system.59 Although the
above decisions seem to place such a restriction on the judiciary, little in the
way of clarity can be gleaned from these cases, because the courts in other
circuits have adopted the contrary position.
54. US. CONS?. amend. V provides that private property may not be taken for public use without just com-
pensation. See infra note 109, and accompanying text.
55. 30.64 Acres, 795 F.2d at 802.
56. 30.64 Acres, 795 F.2d at 801. The distinction between civil and criminal cases, as a determining factor in
authorizing courts to appoint counsel to indigents, virtually disappears when one considers the context in which
most Section 1915(d) cases arise. The vast majority of these cases are brought by prison inmates, or those alleging
a violation of their constitutional rights. If the denial of counsel would result in fundamental unfairness impinging
on due process rights, whether in the context of a criminal or civil proceeding, the result is still the same--the
denial of individual rights guaranteed under the Constitution. See LaClair v. United States, 374 F.2d 486 (7th
Cir. 1967). But see Allison v. Wilson, 277 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Owens v. Swift Agricultural & Chem.
Corp., 477 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Va. 1979), affd, 612 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1979) (presumption against appointing
counsel in prisoner's civil rights suit).
57. See supra note 51.
58. Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE LJ. 545, 548 (1966); see also Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932), where the court acknowledged that potential pitfalls for a pro se litigant were
similar in civil and criminal trials.
59. See Ehrlich v. Van Epps, 428 F.2d 363, 364 (7th Cir. 1970); Gray v. Wisconsin Department of Health,
495 F. Supp. 321, 322 (E.D. Wisc. 1980) (denying motion to appoint counsel because it lacked power, it only had
power to request that counsel provide service); Turner v. Steward, 497 F. Supp. 557, 558 (E.D. Ky. 1980); Chap-
man v. Kliendienst, 507 F.2d 1246, 1250 (7th Cir. 1974).
1010 [Vol. 51:1001
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES
2. Expansive Interpretation of Section 1915(d)
At the opposite extreme, the courts in other circuits have read Section
1915(d) more broadly,60 requiring an attorney to represent an indigent litigant
when requested to do so by the court. In McKeever v. Israel,61 the Seventh
Circuit reversed a district court's dismissal of the petitioner's civil rights claim
against the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, and re-
manded the case for further proceedings and the appointment of counsel. At
trial, the petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel under Section 1915(d)
was denied, and the petitioner was forced to proceed pro se. On appeal, how-
ever, the court held that "[t]he district court failed entirely to exercise its dis-
cretion under Section 1915(d) because it did not recognize its authority to ap-
point counsel. '62 Rather, "the vast weight of authority in this Circuit and
elsewhere demonstrates that the power of a court to provide counsel under Sec-
tion 1915(d) is commonly referred to as the power to 'appoint.'"63 The court
also attacked a misperception which has been responsible for supporting the
contrary view of Section 1915(d): that because Section 1915(d) does not pro-
vide a means for compensating appointed counsel, the statute cannot be con-
strued as requiring an attorney to serve. The majority pointed out that "[t]he
unavailability of funds to compensate an appointed attorney. . . has no bearing
on the power of a court to provide counsel under Section 1915(d)." 64 In fact,
Congress has authorized the appointment of counsel in other circumstances
without providing for compensation.63
Like the Seventh Circuit, the Eighth Circuit has been liberal in construing
Section 1915(d). In Peterson v. Nadler,6" the court of appeals reversed a lower
court ruling that it had no power to appoint counsel to represent an indigent in
a civil case. The Eighth Circuit held that "[s]uch a ruling overlooks the express
authority given it in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) to appoint counsel in civil cases.167 In
the overall interest of the proper administration of justice, the Peterson court
60. A survey of over 300 district court and court of appeals decisions which have construed Section 1915(d)
revealed that an overwhelming majority of courts referred to their power under that section as the power to
"appoint" rather than merely to "request" that counsel serve. In 163 cases, the courts referred to their authority
to "appoint" or their power of "appointment of counsel." On the other hand, only 34 decisions saw the court's
power as limited to "requesting" that counsel represent an indigent. Although these results seem to point conclu-
sively to the power under Section 1915(d) as being one of "appointment," one must be careful before drawing any
conclusions based on these statistics alone. In more cases than not, the interpretation of Section 1915(d) was only
a secondary issue in the case, so the court did not focus on its specific meaning. In most instances, the outcome of
the case did not turn on the construction given to Section 1915(d), but on some other substantive or procedural
ground. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
61. McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir. 1982).
62. Id. at 1319.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1320.
65. See also Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 886-87 (7th Cir. 1981) (appoint); McBride v. Soos, 594 F.2d
610, 613 (7th Cir. 1979) (appoint); LaClair v. United States, 374 F.2d 486, 489 (7th Cir. 1967) (appointment);
see infra notes 111-17 and accompanying text (discussing the validity of the argument that such appointments
constitute a taking in violation of the fifth amendment).
66. Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1971).
67. Id. at 757 (emphasis added).
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found that such cases present circumstances requiring the appointment of
counsel. 68
Finally, in Nelson v. Redfield Lithograph Printing,9 the Eighth Circuit
again took a more expansive view of its powers under Section 1915(d). Al-
though it conceded that indigents have no constitutional or statutory right to
counsel in civil cases, the court had "in the past acknowledged the express au-
thority of the district court to make such appointments.1 70 Even though the
Nelson court refused to reverse the decision of the district court denying the
appointment of counsel, it underscored the policy on which the circuit had long
relied:
Lawyers have long served in state and federal practice as appointed counsel for indi-
gents in both criminal and civil cases. The vast majority of the bar have viewed such
appointments to be integrally within their professional duty to provide public service.
Only rarely are lawyers asked to serve in civil matters. We have the utmost confidence
that lawyers will always be found who will fully cooperate in rendering the indigent
equal justice at the bar.7 1
It was in the midst of this uncertain atmosphere that a dispute arose be-
tween a lawyer in a small rural town, and the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Iowa.
IV. MALLARD v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
A. Background
John Mallard was a thirty-three year old business attorney with the three-
lawyer firm of Marcus & Mallard located in Fairfield, Iowa. In June 1987,
Mallard was asked to represent two inmates and one former inmate from the
Iowa State Penitentiary. The three indigents had sued prison officials under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that prison guards and administrators had filed false
disciplinary reports against them, mistreated them physically, and endangered
their lives by exposing them as informants.7 2
Mallard was selected to serve under a system instituted in Iowa in Febru-
ary 1986 upon the urging of the Eighth Circuit.7 3 Pursuant to the court's direc-
tive, once a district court determined that an indigent party qualified for repre-
sentation under Section 1915(d), the clerk of courts would forward the case to
the Volunteer Lawyers Project ("VLP"), a joint venture of the Legal Services
Corporation of Iowa and the Iowa State Bar Association.74 The VLP had a
roster of all attorneys licensed to practice and in good standing in the district,
68. Id.
69. 728 F.2d 1003 (8th Cir. 1984).
70. Id. at 1004.
71. Id. at 1007 (quoting Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 758 (8th Cir. 1971)); see. e.g., Whisenant v.
Yuam, 739 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1984); Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1981); Shields v. Jackson, 570 F.2d
284 (8th Cir. 1978).
72. This summary of facts was paraphrased from Montague, Take This Case for Free. ..or Else, A.BA.
J. 54, 54 (May 1989).
73. Nelson, 728 F.2d at 1005.
74. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1816 (1989).
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and selected lawyers from this list after passing over any attorney who had
volunteered for VLP referrals of pro bono state court cases.75
If an attorney contacted by the VLP objected to the appointment because
of time constraints, a grace period of up to one month would allow the attorney
to rearrange his caseload. If the attorney expressed concern about a lack of
familiarity with the area of the law, a VLP lawyer would explain the resource
materials and other support available to assist the attorney. Lawyers who were
chosen under the plan could apply to the district court for reimbursement of
out-of-pocket costs. 78 They could also keep any fee award provided by statute,
but were not guaranteed any compensation under Section 1915(d). 77
Mallard was to appear before the district court in the case of Mark Allen
Trarnan v. Steve Parkin. After reviewing the issues involved, Mallard filed a
motion to withdraw, believing himself incompetent to handle the litigation of a
Section 1983 action. He asserted that he did not like the "role of confronting
other persons in a litigation setting, accusing them of misdeeds, or questioning
their veracity. '7 8 Although Mallard stressed his unfamiliarity with Section 1983
actions, he argued that he should be permitted to withdraw, not because of his
inexperience in interpreting the statute and case law, but because he was not a
litigation attorney.79 Instead, he offered to volunteer his services "in an area of
the law in which he possessed some expertise, such as bankruptcy, and securities
law." 80 A magistrate denied Mallard's motion, and he appealed to the district
court. The district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, and expressly ruled
that Section 1915(d) "empowers the court to appoint attorneys to represent in-
digent civil litigants." 81 Mallard then sought a writ of mandamus from the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals to compel the district court to grant his motion
to withdraw the appointment. The circuit court, without opinion, denied the
application for mandamus, and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
B. Majority Opinion: The Plain Meaning of Section 1915(d)
In a rather terse and narrowly-tailored opinion, Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority, reversed the decision of the court below. Refusing to let its
analysis stray beyond the language of the statute itself, the majority determined
that by using the word "request" in Section 1915(d), Congress did not intend to
license the compulsory appointment of counsel in civil cases. The basis for the
majority's decision was its holding in United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, in
which the Court underscored a guiding principle of constitutional and statutory
interpretation: "The plain meaning of the legislation should be conclusive, ex-
cept in the rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce
75. Id. at 1816.
76. Id. at 1817.
77. Id.
78. Brief for Respondent at 3, Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989) (No. 87-1490).
79. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1817.
80. Id.
81. Brief for Respondent, supra note 78, at 5.
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a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters. In such cases,
the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls.18 2 As this
part of the analysis will point out, the majority's decision fails under both
prongs of the Ron Pair test.
The majority began by defining the word "request" according to the mean-
ing commonly given to it by Webster's Dictionary. There, "request" means sim-
ply to "ask," "petition," or "entreat."-8 3 "There is little reason," the Court con-
tinued, "to think that Congress did not intend 'request' to bear its most common
meaning when it used the word in § 1915(d).18 4 To support its view, the major-
ity contrasted Subsection 1915(d) with Subsection 1915(c), which reads: "The
officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in
such cases. Witnesses shall attend as in other cases and the same remedies shall
be available as are provided for by law in other cases."85 The majority con-
cluded that "Congress evidently knew how to require service when it deemed
compulsory service appropriate." 8 The Court's logic, although certainly plausi-
ble, is not as conclusive as the majority suggests. An equally valid rationale for
Congress' choice of the word "request" is that language any more coercive was
not necessary in light of an attorney's preexisting obligation to render service
when a court deemed such service necessary.8 7
Moreover, the majority's strict linguistic analysis is unconvincing because it
was interpreting those words only as they appeared on paper. A proper analysis
would have considered the meaning of the words as spoken from the mouths of
the federal judges who are responsible for implementing them. There is little
doubt that the word "request" means something completely different when in-
voked by an acquaintance or a subordinate rather than by one in a position of
authority. 8 A court's "request" that an attorney perform some service certainly
carries greater persuasive force than if the indigent had made the request him-
self. Thus, to attempt to construe the plain meaning of "request" outside its
intended context imparts a meaning to Section 1915(d) which Congress never
intended.
Even if the "plain meaning" of Section 1915(d) were beyond dispute, Ron
Pair requires that the statutory interpretation not conflict with the clear intent
82. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 109 S. Ct. 1026, 1031 (1989); see also Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687-88 (1985).
83. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1818.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. As recent scholarship makes clear,
the better comparison is between "shall" in § 1915(c), commanding court officers to perform their
normal duties, and "may" in § 1915(d), giving the court discretionary power to request. To com-
pare "shall" to "request," as Justice Brennan did, ignores the sentence structure of the two sec-
tions and does not illuminate the meaning of "request," for the statute retains a comprehensible
structure whether "request" is read as mandatory or not.
Leading Cases, Proceedings in Farina Pauperis, 1988 Term, 103 HARV. L. Rav. 384, 390 n.53 (1989).
87. Powell, 287 U.S. at 73 (attorney is an officer of court and as such must provide service when required by
court).
88. Justice Brennan conceded that "'request' may double for 'demand' or 'command' when it is used as a
noun;" however, he continued, "its ordinary and natural signification when used as a verb was precatory when
Congress enacted the provision." Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1818.
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of Congress. The Court, however, could find no clear evidence that Congress
intended the verb "request" to be synonymous with the verb "appoint." 89 First
the majority dismissed, as inconclusive, the fact that Section 1915(d) was
adopted "to keep pace" with the in forma pauperis statutes then in effect in the
states." Because the state statutes expressly authorized a court.to appoint or
assign counsel, "Congress' decision to allow the federal courts to do no more
than 'request' attorneys to serve, in full awareness of the more stringent state
practices, seems to evince a desire to permit attorneys to decline representation
of indigent litigants."91 However, such reasoning is difficult to reconcile with the
express Congressional desire to insure that a party to a diversity suit, suing in a
state which authorized the appointment of counsel to indigents, would not be
made to suffer by the defendant's removal of the suit to federal court.92
The majority minimized the significance of the courts' historical authority
to assign counsel to indigents, stating that the "English precedents from the
fifteenth to the late nineteenth century, . . . which . . . Congress might have
had in mind . . . were equally murky."93 As it dismissed common-law history
as inconclusive, the majority also rejected more modern historical evidence.
Rather than reconciling the body of case law which developed within the decade
after Section 1915(d) was enacted, it relegated this analysis to a footnote,
merely stating that these decisions "certainly do not support this inference. On
the contrary, they tell against it."' By interpreting Section 1915(d) in a histori-
cal vacuum, the Court avoided becoming enmeshed in the policy issues which
undergirded the district court's position.
Finally, again falling back on statutory construction, the majority rejected
the District Court's contention that if Section 1915(d) only allowed the courts
to ask, but not to compel, lawyers to represent indigent litigants, the statute
would be rendered a nullity. The District Court reasoned that it was unneces-
sary to give courts the statutory authorization simply to ask an attorney to re-
present an indigent. Such a reading of the statute, conferring no coercive power
on the federal courts, would be superfluousf 5 The majority, however, responded
89. A comparison of a federal statute of 1790, Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9 § 29, 1 Stat. 118 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1982)), the only relevant antecedent statute, with the 1892 Act 28 U.S.C. § 1915,
does not reveal, as the majority suggests, that Congress demonstrated a conscious desire to depart from the com-
pulsory language. Although the Act of 1790 does use the word "assign," it also speaks of the defendant's "re-
quest" for counsel-a request with which the court is required to comply. Thus, prior to 1892, Congress had used
"request" to signify mandatory compliance. Leading Cases, supra note 86 at 391.
90. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1819 n.4. See H.R. REP. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1892). The House
Judiciary Committee reported that "[m]any humane and enlightened states have such a law (allowing actions to
proceed in forma pauperis], and the United States Government ought to keep pace with this enlightened judg-
ment." Id. at 2.
91. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1819. Although the Congress sought to achieve the same ends as the states, there
is no evidence that Congress considered, and then rejected, the idea that its statute should exactly mimic the state
statutes. Thus, the variance between the language of the federal statute, and that used in some states' statutes
should not, in and of itself, be a sufficient reason for the Court to construe Section 1915(d) in direct contradistinc-
tion to the state statutes. See Leading Cases, supra note 86 at 390.
92. H.R. RaP. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1892).
93. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1819.
94. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1819-20, n.4.
95. Id. at 1821.
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that "[s]tatutory provisions may simply codify existing rights or powers."90
Therefore, Section 1915(d) was to be read only to legitimize a court's power,
thereby confronting "a lawyer with an important ethical decision; one need not
interpret it to authorize the imposition of sanctions should a lawyer decide not
to serve."9 Such a construction, by necessity, casts doubt on the notion that
federal courts are vested with some measure of inherent power.98
At the close of its opinion, the majority appeared to concede that its re-
strictive view of Section 1915(d) in Mallard would not lay to rest the confusion
and controversy that has characterized judicial interpretation of the statute.
The majority understood that certain collateral issues, which they refused to
decide in Mallard, would again bring Section 1915(d) into the Court's scrutiny.
First, the majority emphasized that it did "not mean to question, let alone deni-
grate, lawyers' ethical obligation to assist those who are too poor to afford coun-
sel, or to suggest that requests made pursuant to Section 1915(d) may be lightly
declined because they give rise to no ethical claim."9 9 Secondly, the Court re-
fused to express an opinion on the question of whether the federal courts possess
inherent authority to compel lawyers to represent an indigent litigant. The ma-
jority foreshadowed the decision it may be forced to reach if an attorney de-
clines to serve under Section 1915(d) in the future:
Although respondent. . . urge[s] us to affirm the court of appeal's judgment on the
ground that the federal courts do not have such authority, the District Court did not
invoke its inherent power in its opinion below, and the Court of Appeals did not offer
this ground for denying Mallard's application for a writ of mandamus. We therefore
reserve that question for another day.100
Thus it appears that the law, as it relates to Section 1915(d) and, more impor-
tantly, to coercive appointments of counsel in civil cases generally, will remain
in flux.
V. AN ANALYSIS OF MALLARD: THE POLICY BEHIND THE HOLDING
As the dissent in Mallard makes clear, "[t]he relationship between a court
and the members of its bar is not defined by statute alone. The duties of the
practitioner are an amalgam of tradition, respect for the profession, the inherent
power of the judiciary, and the commands that are set forth in the canons of
ethics, rules of court, and legislative enactments." 10 1 In addition, the imposition
of such a duty upon a nonconsenting attorney raises legitimate constitutional
questions which may proscribe a court's power of appointment. This section of
the Note will explore these issues, a number of which may be implicit in the
majority's opinion, and others of which were omitted from the Mallard decision
but must certainly be addressed by the Court in the future.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Brief for Respondent, supra note 78, at 5.
99. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1822-23.
100. Id. at 1823.
101. Id.
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A. Constitutional Dimensions
A central tenet of constitutional jurisprudence requires that when a court is
confronted with the choice of deciding a case based on statutory interpretation
alone, or looking beyond the statute to decide the underlying constitutional is-
sue, a court will ordinarily construe the statute so as to avoid the constitutional
question. 0 2 In Mallard, the Supreme Court was presented with just such a
choice. Because a broad view of a court's powers under Section 1915 may have
drawn the constitutionality of the statute into question and required the Court
to resolve a number of constitutional issues, the Court opted to decide the Mal-
lard case on narrow statutory grounds. Therefore, the Court's decision may re-
flect, to a great degree, its reluctance to become embroiled in constitutional
disputes, rather than a decided attempt to strip the courts of any of their au-
thority under Section 1915(d). This section will lay out the constitutional argu-
ments which may have influenced the Court's decision in Mallard, and com-
ment as to how these arguments may affect the determination of this issue in
the future.103
1. First Amendment Considerations
It is generally understood that the prohibitions of the first amendment ex-
tend beyond the guarantee that an individual shall have the right to speak as he
chooses; it also protects an individual's right to associate with others to promote
certain causes and ideas, and to be free from coerced association with causes,
ideas, and conduct engaged in by others which he finds disagreeable.'0 4 Thus,
on occasion, the first amendment has been invoked by creative lawyers to pro-
tect them from entering into certain associations, within the lawyer-client con-
text itself, which they might find to be repugnant. The argument runs as fol-
lows: If a lawyer is compelled 05 to represent a client who holds values and
beliefs which are offensive to the attorney, and the attorney is forced to associ-
ate with, and adopt the views of this individual, then counsel is being compelled
102. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936). In Ashwander, the Court stated that
"[w]hen the validity of an act of Congress is drawn in question,. . . it is a cardinal principle that this Court will
first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." Id. at
34849.
103. Mallard's brief raises a questionable equal protection argument, and thus it will not be discussed in
detail in the text. Nevertheless, the Court might have felt compelled to address this issue if it decided to interpret
Section 1915(d) more expansively. In essence, Mallard argued that the list of attorneys relied on by the VLP did
not include the names of every attorney practicing law in Iowa, thus those whose names appeared on the list would
be required to carry a disproportionate burden of the Section 1915 cases. However, attorneys do not constitute a
suspect class, and therefore the argument is easily disposed of because the state need only have a rational basis on
which to support such appointments. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam);
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463-65 (1957).
104. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). See. e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S.
477, 487 (1975); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963).
105. In order for this argument to have any validity, the attorney must be "compelled" to represent a client
under a penalty of forfeiture of the attorney's admission to practice before the bar. This theory is based on the
presumption that the government cannot condition a benefit on the relinquishment of a constitutional right. See,
e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (admission to state bar may not be conditioned upon the
surrender of a first amendment right to advertise services and fees); Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1971) (admission to state bar may not be conditioned upon an individual's beliefs).
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to espouse ideas and associate with individuals, contrary to the dictates of his
conscience. To be sure, the first amendment does not contemplate such an inter-
ference with an individual's freedom of association or speech. Its guarantees
apply to attorneys and non-attorneys alike, even though lawyers have been tra-
ditionally advised that they should advocate a client's cause even-if disagreeable
with his personal beliefs. 108
However, in order to act in the client's best interests, the lawyer must often
adopt, at least in part, the mind-set of the client. Thus when an attorney is
compelled by a court to embrace the views of another, the government's decree
may well be at odds with the attorney's conscience, and first amendment guar-
antees are clearly put in jeopardy.10 7
This argument loses much of its force when the attorney is being compelled
to advocate on behalf of a client with whom he only mildly disagrees. Unlike
the situation where an attorney is required to represent a client whose views he
finds obnoxious, the attorney who simply cannot identify with his client's opin-
ion is not presented with a similar crisis of conscience. In such a case, it is
unlikely that the attorney would have to adopt the beliefs of the client, but need
only act as an advocate on his behalf.1 °8 Therefore, the state's interest in ensur-
ing equal access to the justice system, and maintaining the character of its bar
is certainly compelling enough to outweigh any first amendment interests
claimed by counsel.'0 9 By accepting a license to practice law, the lawyer has, in
effect, consented to accepting certain duties and obligations to which the lay
population in general is not subject." 0 Thus, neither the courts nor counsel
should lightly regard a lawyer's attempt to forsake a professional duty on the
basis of an ambiguous first amendment protection.
In Mallard, the petitioner raised the first amendment challenge in his
brief, arguing that requiring counsel to represent an indigent "necessarily re-
quires the exercise of his speech (i) against his will (in light of his belief that he
is not competent to undertake the representation) and (ii) in a manner that is
contrary to his good conscience (in light of his dislike for confrontational and
accusatory speech).""' However, these allegations alone do not appear to be
enough to support a first amendment violation. Mallard was not being forced to
adopt a belief which he found personally abhorrent; he merely claimed that he
disliked litigious situations (a shaky foundation on which to build a first amend-
ment claim, considering Mallard personally represented himself throughout
106. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIuTY, EC 2-26 to 2-29; MODEL RuLES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.15(a) (1980) ("A lawyer's representation of a client, whether by retainer or appoint-
ment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.").
107. Baird v. Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1971) (state cannot inquire into individual's beliefs, views or associa-
tions "to lay a foundation for barring an applicant from the practice of law").
108. Advocacy and belief are distinct in the sense that the tradition of the lawyer's profession strongly urges
the lawyer to represent a client regardless of the lawyer's personal beliefs. In order to be an effective advocate, a
lawyer need not always personally accept the client's views or beliefs. See MODEL CODE OF PROFEsmmsONAL RE-
SPONSIILITY, EC 2-26 to 2-29.
109. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961) (payment of $15.00 as a condition of practicing law did
not violate first amendment).
110. United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
111. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S.Ct. 1814 (1989) (No. 87-1490).
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every stage of this lawsuit). If an attorney could escape the representation of a
client in this type of situation, it is difficult to conceive of any situation in which
the first amendment would not be implicated. It is doubtful that the federal
courts would want to open such a Pandora's Box.
2. Fifth Amendment Considerations
Constitutional scholars have recognized that the fifth amendment's takings
clause may provide an obstacle to a court's appointment of counsel in a civil
case.112 This argument rests on the premise that a requirement of service, with
or without financial alternative, might constitute a taking without just
compensation.113
In order for this argument to have any merit, it must first be demonstrated
that an attorney's professional services constitute "property" within the mean-
ing of the fifth amendment.' In Willner v. Committee on Character and Fit-
ness," '5 the Supreme Court held that "[a] State cannot exclude a person from
the practice of law . . . in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due
Process Clause." 6 Because the government is only required to provide due pro-
cess protections when a property interest or a liberty interest is taken away, it is
evident that the Court equated the license to practice law with a protected prop-
erty interest in the due process context. However, this rationale has not been
extended to fifth amendment cases." 7 Even if an attorney's license to practice
law is considered a compensable property interest, the question remains as to
whether an attorney's personal services are a property interest protected under
the fifth amendment. Like a license to practice law, the Supreme Court has
never held that an attorney's services, alone, are a compensable property inter-
est. However, a number of lower courts have held that a professional who is
compelled to perform uncompensated services has suffered a taking because the
government has forced him to expend his time, experience and skills-attributes
which the courts considered to be "the professional's stock in trade."",8 Because
112. See generally Stevens, Forcing Attorneys to Represent Indigent Civil Litigants: The Problems and
Some Proposals, 18 U. Mica. J.L. REF. 767 (1985). Unlike some scholars, the courts have not been so receptive of
this novel legal theory; see, e.g., Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973); Dillon, 346 F.2d 633.
113. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 771; see US. CONST. amend. V ("private property may not be taken for public
use, without just compensation").
114. An attorney's professional services can only be considered a taking if the appointment interferes with
"reasonable, investment-backed expectations." United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 107 (1985); Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51, 65-66 n.21 (1979); see also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 499 (1987).
115. Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
116. Id. at 102.
117. See, e.g., Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 865 (1961) (license to practice law a privilege, not coin-
pensable property interest); Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 558-62, 133 P.2d 325, 330-31 (1943).
It is important to note that the Court found the license to practice law to be a property interest which could
not be taken without due process, but not property within the compensation clause of the fifth amendment. See
also Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
118. Green, Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases: The Constitutionality of Uncompensated Legal
Assistance, 81 CoLu,. L. REv. 385 (1981); see also Weiner v. Fulton County, 113 Ga. App. 343, 148 S.E.2d 143,
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966); State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, 159 W. Va. 805, 227 S.E.2d 314 (1976)
(taking if appointment denies attorney the opportunity to maintain remunerative practice); Bias v. State, 568 P.2d
1269 (Okla. 1977); People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 35 Ill. 2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337 (1966); State v. Green, 470
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Mallard's license to practice law was not put in jeopardy, but rather he was
only required to surrender a portion of his services in exchange for the privilege
of practicing law, his fifth amendment claims are open to doubt." 9
The characterization of services as property is simply the threshold inquiry
in establishing an uncompensated taking under the fifth amendment. In addi-
tion, it must be demonstrated that the government's requirement of coerced rep-
resentation constitutes a "taking" of private property 20 and not just a noncom-
pensable "regulation.' 2'2 A regulation has been defined as a restriction on a
socially undesirable use of one's property, while a "taking" constitutes an af-
firmative appropriation, or physical acquisition, of property.' 2' One scholar has
argued that a taking can only be justified where the burdens and benefits of the
appropriated services are equally distributed, and where there was an average
reciprocity of advantage. 1 3 Thus where one is called on by the government to
perform a service-appearing as a witness at trial for example-the taking will
be justified because it promotes the public interest (the administration of jus-
tice), and gives rise to a reciprocal right in the property owner (the right to call
upon others to appear as witnesses at his own trial). 12"4 The validity of the argu-
ment also rests on the assumption that the obligation falls equally upon all citi-
zens and does not create economic hardship."25 This commentator thus con-
cludes that court-appointed attorneys "enjoy reciprocal advantages from the
state that justify a denial of compensation under the takings clause.""16
Therefore, if Mallard did indeed suffer a "taking," under the circum-
stances of this case, it was probably justified. He derived substantial economic
benefit from the profession, and was expected to contribute something of equal
value. Additionally, Mallard knew upon entering the legal profession that the
Iowa Bar would expect him to devote a certain amount of his time and skill to
S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1971) (where burden is more than profession should shoulder); Honorc v. Washington State Bd.
of Prison Terms & Paroles, 77 Wash. 2d 660, 466 P.2d 485 (1970) (extremely heavy and time-consuming bur-
den). See, e.g., Sehware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252
(1957). Schware and Konigsberg were not truly "takings" cases, but instead dealt with the definition of property
under the due process clause. In that context, the practice of law was viewed as a protectable property interest,
and unreasonable standards for admission to the bar were struck down as violating an attorney's due process
rights.
119. In order to conclusively establish a protectable property interest within the meaning of the fifth amend-
ment, it is necessary to show: (1) a reasonable expectation that legal services are property for private use only, and
(2) that compulsory representation without compensation is not fair. See generally, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978). It is equally unlikely that Mallard's services would be considered prop-
erty under this test.
120. An attorney's consent to provide representation obviates the need to construe the appointment under the
takings clause. An application for membership to the bar has been construed as consent to appointment. Lewis v.
Lane, 816 F.2d 1165, 1168-69 (7th Cir. 1987); Family Div. of Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 705
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266-67 (5th Cir. 1982).
121. Green, supra note 118, at 386.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 387.
124. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)). See also Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (no taking where there is exchange of benefits).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 388. The economic benefit of the monopoly to practice law offsets the burden of accepting court
appointments. Id. See also Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977),
afid 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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public service. 2 7 As such, the government has simply required Mallard to per-
form a civic obligation owed by a citizen to his government, and has not
"taken" property within the meaning of the fifth amendment. 12 8
3. Thirteenth Amendment Considerations
The thirteenth amendment states that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction." 112 9 This amendment was ratified after the Civil War with the pri-
mary object of abolishing slavery.130 Although the Court has hinted that the
thirteenth amendment extends beyond the abolition of slavery as an institu-
tion,1 31 such an expansion has been restricted to situations where there is some
type of forced service, or where labor is compelled by law, or by threat of con-
tinued confinement, and where the individual is left with no alternative but to
perform the service, or suffer an equally oppressive loss of liberty." 2 Thus, in
Flood v. Kuhn, the Second Circuit held that the thirteenth amendment is not
violated when an individual is threatened with the loss of employment, because
the individual is free to seek other, even unrelated, forms of employment. 3
Therefore, in cases of coerced appointments of counsel in civil cases, an attorney
could argue that a compulsory appointment would violate the thirteenth amend-
ment's proscription against involuntary servitude; however, because counsel is
not presented with a choice of complying with the court order, or facing con-
finement, or another equally egregious loss of liberty, the thirteenth amendment
will most likely not be implicated. In fact, the Fifth Circuit, in White v. United
127. Nelson v. Redfield Lithograph Printing, 728 F.2d 1003 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting Peterson v. Nadler, 452
F.2d 754, 758 (8th Cir. 1971)); see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Powell cannot be distinguished
on the ground that it was a criminal case and this is a civil case, because "if a requirement of uncompensated
service in a criminal case does not constitute a 'taking' . . . then it cannot be said categorically that such viola-
tions exist in civil appointments. The two kinds of cases differ in degree but not in quality. State ex rel. Scott v.
Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 773 (Mo. 1985). Under the ethical rules, an attorney should anticipate that a portion of
his services will be directed toward the public welfare. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-29
(1980) (ethical obligation to accept pro bono appointments absent compelling reasons). Accord MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2 (1984).
128. Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973). See United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966), where the court considered the claim of an attorney appointed to
represent a prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1984) who claimed that such representation required compensation
under the fifth amendment. The court rejected this argument, noting that
An applicant for admission to practice law may justly be deemed to be aware of the traditions of the
profession which he is joining, and to know that one of these traditions is that a lawyer is an officer of the
court obligated to represent indigents for little or no compensation upon court order. Thus, the lawyer has
consented to, and assumed, this obligation and when he is called upon to fulfill it, he cannot contend that
it is a "taking of his services."
Id. at 635.
129. US . CONsT. amend. XIIL
130. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
131. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944).
132. See United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964).
133. Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), affd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); but see In re Nine Applica-
tions for Appointment of Counsel in Title VII Proceedings, 475 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ala. 1979), (assignment of
counsel may violate thirteenth amendment; attorney has no responsibility to court or to public and state cannot
exact such duty).
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States Pipe & Foundry Co., held that the involuntary appointment of counsel
could never form the basis of a thirteenth amendment claim. 34 The court rea-
soned that, because lawyers owe certain obligations to the courts and to the
public, the lawyer's public duty overrides any constitutional challenge. The
court equated the claim of "involuntary servitude" under the thirteenth amend-
ment with a nonconsenting attorney's claim that compulsory representation im-
poses a "servitude" under the fifth amendment.135 Because it was clear that an
appointment of counsel in a civil case will not constitute a "taking" without just
compensation, it is "highly improbable that a thirteenth amendment attack...
can ever be sustained." '
Further undermining any thirteenth amendment claim is the "public duty"
exception created by the courts. Under this doctrine, the government has a rec-
ognized right to compel citizens to render public service, even when the compul-
sion amounts to involuntary service. An obvious example is the government's
right to compel military service."37 The government can legislate on those mat-
ters which are in the interests of the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens,
and by so doing, define what is in the public's interest, giving rise to correspond-
ing public duty."38 Because Congress believed that access to the judicial system
was of critical concern to its citizens, it enacted Section 1915(d), and by so
doing, imposed a duty upon the legal profession. Therefore, it is doubtful that a
court would entertain an objection to Section 1915(d) based on the thirteenth
amendment. Nor is it likely that the Supreme Court had this argument in mind
when it decided Mallard. It nevertheless raises interesting questions over which
scholars and commentators will continue to debate.
B. The Nature of the Profession and the Lawyer's Ethical Duty
"The practice of law is distinguished from an ordinary occupation in busi-
ness or trade by its high standards of conduct and commitment to public ser-
vice."" 3 For attorneys, the pursuit of a livelihood is only incidental to the pri-
mary reason for singling out the legal profession from a number of other
professions which also require a significant amount of education and training, 4 ,
134. White v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 646 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1981).
135. Id. at 205 n.3.
136. Id.
137. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 373 (1918) (thirteenth amendment not intended to "destroy
the power of the government to compel citizens to public service").
138. Green, supra note 118, at 381.
139. Brief for Respondent, supra note 78, at 26; R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTQUITY TO MODERN
TIMEs 5 (1953). But see Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual Lawyer
and of the Organized Bar, 12 UCLA L. REv. 438 (1965) (lawyers, like grocers or housebuilders, should not be
required to provide free stock in trade to needy); Note, The Uncompensated Appointed Counsel System A Con-
stitutional and Social Transgression, 60 Ky. LJ. 710 (1972).
140. Opponents of mandatory pro bono argue that the state cannot require them to provide valuable re-
sources unless similar burdens are imposed on doctors, dentists, educators, accountants and other professionals. C.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETmcs, 953 (1983). However, unlike these other professions, a lawyer's relationship
with society is defined by the Constitution-explicitly, in its recognition of a constitutional right to counsel, US.
CONST. amend. VI, and implicitly-through the preeminent status given to the concepts of justice, due process,
and fair trial. See US. CONsr. amend. V, XIV; see also US. CONSr. preamble.
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namely, the "[p]ursuit of the learned art in the public service." 141 Counsel's
obligation to advance the cause of justice was best articulated by Justice
Cardozo:
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions . . . .The [attorney]
appellant was received into that ancient fellowship for something more than private
gain. He became an officer of the court, and, like the court itself, is an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice. His co-operation with the court was due when-
ever justice would be imperiled if co-operation was withheld. He might be assigned as
counsel for the needy, in causes criminal or civil, serving without pay.14 2
Although the new Model Rules of Professional Conduct 43 rejected the im-
position of a general duty for all lawyers to render pro bono service-instead
opting to use more permissive language-in certain circumstances counsel is
strongly urged to accept its obligation to render unpaid service. The Canons of
Professional Ethics,144 The Model Code of Professional Responsibility,"54  and
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct"48 all recognize counsels' professional
obligation to serve when requested to do so by a court. While the Canons speak
only of appointments to represent indigent prisoners, the Code and Model Rules
both speak of appointments to represent indigents generally.
The Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility imposes similar duties upon
attorneys, and in certain circumstances compliance with the Iowa Code requires
141. R. PouND, supra note 139, at 5.
142. People ex reL Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470-71, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928).
143. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 6.1 (1989) states:
A lawyer should render public interest legal service. A lawyer may discharge this responsibility by provid-
ing professional services at no fee or a reduced fee to persons of limited means or to public service or
charitable groups or organizations, by service in activities for improvement of the law, the legal system or
the legal profession, and by financial support for organizations that provide legal services to persons of
limited means.
144. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL Ermcs, Canon 4 (1908) ("A lawyer assigned as counsel to an indigent pris-
oner ought not to ask to be excused for any trivial reason, and should always exert his best efforts on his behalf.").
145. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY EC 2-29 (1980) reads as follows:
When a lawyer is appointed by a court or requested by a bar association to undertake representation of a
person unable to obtain counsel, whether for financial or other reasons, he should not seek to be excused
from undertaking the representation except for compelling reasons. Compelling reasons do not include
such factors as the repugnance of the subject matter of the proceeding, the identity or position of the
person involved in the case, the belief of the lawyer that the defendant in a criminal proceeding is guilty,
or the belief of the lawyer regarding the merits of the case.
(footnotes omitted). See also MODEL CODE OF PROFE'SSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1980) (rendition of free
legal services to those unable to pay reasonable fees continues to be an obligation of each lawyer, and every
attorney should support all proper efforts to meet this need for legal services).
146. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2 (1989), Accepting Appointments:
A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent persons except for good cause,
such as:
(a) representing the client is likely to result in the violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or
other law;
(b) representing the client is likely to result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer, or
(c) the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer
relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client.
See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuT Rule 6.1 comment (1984) ("The basic responsibility for
providing legal services for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer."); but see Iowa Code
of Professional Responsibility, DR 6-101(A)(1), IOWA CODE ANN. § 602 app. A (Wtst 1988) ("A lawyer shall
not: (1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent to handle, without
associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it.").
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that an attorney do more than come to grips with some personal moral or ethi-
cal dilemma.14 Although the Iowa statute imposes only an ethical considera-
tion, and not any express disciplinary sanctions, the Iowa courts have made the
violation of an ethical consideration, standing alone, grounds for disciplinary
action.148 In Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Behnke, the
Iowa Supreme Court held that "[a]ll lawyers practicing before this court are
bound by the canons . . . . They are not free to view them merely as aspira-
tional.1'' 49 By failing to take into account the lawyer's ethical responsibilities,
which are encouraged under the professional codes, and made mandatory under
Iowa law, the Supreme Court in Mallard trivializes both the lawyer's profes-
sional and ethical duties, and the court's ability to encourage compliance. 50
Surely, when Congress enacted Section 1915(d), it did not, at the very least,
intend it to be an instrument which would allow lawyers to evade their ethical
obligations. However, that appears to be a possible consequence of Mallard.''
Certain commentators have suggested that a policy of dragooning lawyers
into service of indigents will neither advance the cause of the indigent, nor that
of the profession generally. 152 Instead, critics contend, such a system will work
an injustice on indigents, while at the same time placing a substantial financial
and professional burden on the attorney. Some also suggest that a mandatory
standard would be demeaning to an attorney's professional status, 53 and that
147. Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 2-27, IOWA CODE ANN. § 602 app. A (West 1988)
("Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should find the time to participate
in serving the disadvantaged. The rendition of free legal services to those unable to pay reasonable fees continues
to be an obligation of each lawyer." (emphasis added)). See also IowA CODE ANN. § 602.10112(7) (West 1988)
(each lawyer, upon admission to the bar, must agree "never to reject for any consideration personal to the attor-
ney or counsellor the cause of the defenseless or oppressed").
148. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa 1979) (app. dis-
missed, 444 U.S. 805 (1979)).
149. Id. at 840 (quoting In re Frerichs, 238 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Iowa 1976)). In addition, the Iowa courts
have disciplined attorneys for violations of ethical considerations in at least six other eases, including Committee
on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Wilson, 270 N.W.2d 613 (Iowa 1978); Committee on Professional Ethics &
Conduct v. Baker, 269 N.W.2d 463 (Iowa 1978); Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Sloan, 262
N.W.2d 262 (Iowa 1978); Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Tommey, 253 N.W.2d 573 (Iowa
1977); Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Bromwell, 221 N.W.2d 777 (Iowa 1977); In re Frerichs,
238 N.W.2d 764 (Iowa 1976).
150. See Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1982). In Branch, the court expressed concern about a
district court's "inability to find counsel willing to take appointments in civil rights actions." Id. at 266. It hoped
that this occurrence was "incorrectly perceived, or that it did not represent a common condition in trial courts."
Id. In the court's opinion, "[aittomeys admitted to practice in the federal courts. . . are or ought to be bound in
the discharge of their duties as court officers by ethical precepts similar to those set out in the American Bar
Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility." Id. at 266-67. The court then proposed a solution: "If
the court continues to have difficulty in obtaining voluntary service of counsel despite their ethical responsibilities,
it may wish to limit the compensated practice by members of its bar to those willing to accept their share of
indigent cases." Id. at 267. See also Rhodes v. Houston, 258 F. Supp. 546, 579 (D. Neb. 1966), ard, 418 F.2d
1309 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1049 (1970) (Pro bono publico work by attorneys is an established
tradition and part of counsel's professional duty).
151. Had counsel been incompetent or unable, for legitimate reasons, to prepare his client's case, his ethical
obligation of representation vanishes. In fact, the attorney has a legal obligation to deeline representation. See
Easley v. State, 334 So. 2d 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); State v. Gasen, 2 Ohio App. 3d 156, 356 N.E.2d 505
(1976); Chaleff v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. App. 3d 721, 138 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1977).
152. See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL EThmcs 952-53 (1986).
153. See Sundberg, Professional Duty and Pro Bono, 55 FLA. BJ. 502 (1981). Along these lines opponents of
mandatory appointment point to the unavoidable consequences of such a system; namely, the transfer of wealth,
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those attorneys who do not cherish the high ideals of the profession should sim-
ply do something else for a living.154 Even though it is true that a mandatory
system of appointing counsel to serve the indigent is less than ideal, such a
system exists because the traditional system has failed. 155 As the former Presi-
dent of the American Bar Association so aptly recognized, "No lawyer should
accept the profession as it is. The law and the profession are dynamic; they are
constantly changing to meet society's needs. Indeed, it seems that the lawyers
who accept the profession's status quo do it little justice, while those who seek
to improve it bring it the greatest honor.'15 6 Therefore, the lawyer turns his
back on the tradition and ideals of his profession when he defers to society or
the government to cure the ills of a system which he swore to uphold. 57
Because lawyers have control over a valuable resource-namely, the ability
to gain access to the courts-a system must exist which ensures that each mem-
ber of society will have access to those tribunals, even if it means that each side
must give something up in the process. 58 If the legal profession does not ad-
dress society's needs, those in need of legal assistance will be forced to turn to
other sources, thus reducing the autonomy that the profession currently
enjoys. 15 9
C. The Judiciary's Inherent Authority
The Supreme Court has recognized that the federal courts "are universally
acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence,
respect, decorum in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates,
and, as a corollary to this proposition, to preserve themselves and their officers
either from the lawyer personally or, if the lawyer is able to transfer its burdens to other clients through higher
fees, from paying clients. See also G. HAZARD, ETMcs IN THE PRACnCE OF LAW 87-88 (1978).
154. Smith, A Mandatory Pro Bono Service Standard-Its Time Has Come, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 727, 734
(1981).
155. For an analysis of the need for the assistance of lawyers in general, see A.BA. FINAL REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO SURVEY LEGAL NEEDs (1978).
156. Smith, supra note 154, at 734.
157. Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundation of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE LJ.
1060, 1079 (1976). Fried contends that "[i]f the lawyer is really to be impressed to serve these admitted social
needs, then his independence and discretion disappear, and he does indeed become a public resource cut up and
disposed of by the public's needs. There would be no justice to such a conception." Id.
158. See also H. DRINKER. LEGAL Ersmcs 59 (1953) ("In recognition of these exclusive privileges the lawyer
is charged with certain obligations to the public. . . [including the duty] to represent without charge those unable
to pay.").
159. Id. It has become increasingly apparent that the legal profession is losing monopolistic foothold in the
legal services market. See, e.g., State Bar v. Cramer, 399 Mich. 116, 123, 249 N.W.2d 1, 2 (1976) ("do-it-
yourself" divorce kits). In Cramer, Justice Williams predicted that laymen would increasingly continue to en-
croach on the legal profession's monopoly to practice law unless the organized bar acts to "make skilled profes-
sional services available to those who have reasonable need for them." Id. at 140, 249 N.W.2d at 10 (Williams, J.,
concurring). See also Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Miles, 192 Colo. 294, 557 P.2d 1202 (1976); In re Thompson, 574
S.W.2d 365 (Mo. 1978); Florida Bar v. Peake, 364 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1978); Palmer v. Unauthorized Practice
Committee of the State Bar of Texas, 438 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
In one case, Florida Bar v. Furman, 376 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1061 (1980),
where a legal secretary gave legal advice to individuals seeking divorce, the secretary's attorney proposed the
innovative, and perhaps inevitable, legal theory that the state may not constitutionally deny access to the legal
system to those unable to pay for matters such as divorce. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971);
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
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from the approach and insults of pollution."160 As such, the federal courts have
the inherent authority to exercise those "powers necessary to protect the func-
tioning of its own processes."' 61 The inherent judicial power of the federal
courts is derived from the very fact that the courts have been created and
charged by the Constitution and Congress with certain duties and powers, not
authorized by statute.'62
More specifically, the Supreme Court has held that a federal court's inher-
ent authority to regulate the conduct of counsel and the bar is derived from the
lawyer's role as an officer of the court and the court's duty to control the pro-
ceeding before it.'6 3 In essence, the rationale of these decisions relies on the fact
that as an officer of the court,'6 4 the attorney, like the court itself, is an instru-
ment used to advance the cause of justice.165 Justice in its most basic form
requires, at least, that both parties to a dispute are effective advocates of their
causes,16 6 and that the parties confront one another in the context of the adver-
sarial system. Thus, as the Court pointed out in Penson v. Ohio,167 "The para-
mount importance of vigorous representation follows from the nature of our ad-
versarial system of justice. This system is premised on the well tested principle
that truth-as well as fairness-is 'best discovered by powerful statements on
both sides of the question.' "168 Because the courts function in this role, they
160. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 820-21 (1987) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 227 (1821)).
161. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. at 821 (Scalia, J., concurring). There, the Court upheld a district court's
power to appoint a private attorney to prosecute a criminal contempt action arising out of a civil case then before
the court. Although the execution of the criminal law is generally a function in which only the executive branch
may engage, the Court held that the "initiation of contempt proceedings to punish disobedience to court orders is
a part of the judicial function" and hence, appointment of private attorneys is within the court's inherent power.
Id. at 795. The Court has defined the inherent powers of the federal courts as those which are "necessary to the
exercise of all others." United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). Simply stated, these powers
are those that the court can call upon to aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the administration of justice, and
the preservation of its independence and integrity. United States v. Scholnick, 606 F.2d 160, 166 (6th Cir. 1979);
State ex rel. Gentry v. Becker, 351 Mo. 769, 777, 174 S.W.2d 181, 183 (1943); People v. Cirillo, 100 Misc. 2d
527, 531, 419 N.Y.S.2d 820, 824 (Sup. Ct. 1979). See, also e.g., Michaclson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924)
(power of contempt essential to administration of justice); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925) (power of
contempt essential to protecting orderly administration of justice and maintaining authority of court).
162. Richey, A Modern Management Technique for Trial Courts to Improve the Quality of Justice: Requir-
ing Direct Testimony to be Submitted in Written Form Prior to Trial, 72 GEo. LJ. 73, 75 (1983).
163. See Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546 (1989); Frazier v. Hecbe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987); United States
v. Hvass, 355 U.S. 570 (1958); In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985); Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333
(1867); Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957); see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
164. There is some dispute as to whether an attorney is truly an "officer of the court" under the English
conception of that term. At least one scholar has suggested that it is inaccurate to characterize American lawyers
is officers of the court. Unlike the English "attorney," who was nothing more than a part of the court's clerical
staff, the American attorneys do not merely possess ministerial duties, nor do they have such an "employer-
employee" relationship with the court. Rather, the American attorney more closely resembles the English "bards-
Cr," who defended and pleaded lawsuits, and had no duty to the courts which arose by the nature of their
velationship, but only from their duty to the King's courts. Green, supra note 118, at 374.
165. Rowe v. Yuba County, 17 Cal. 61, 63 (1860); People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470-71,
162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928); Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957).
166. Maguire, supra note 10.
167. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988).
168. Id. at 352 (quoting Kaufman, Does the Judge Have a Right to Qualified Counsel?, 61 A.B.A. J. 569,
569 (1975) (quoting Lord Eldon)).
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must of necessity have the inherent authority to require the services of counsel,
if in the absence of counsel, justice would be denied. 69
It cannot be doubted that the federal courts have the authority to appoint
counsel in criminal cases. In United States v. Accetturo, the Third Circuit ex-
pressed its concern that the courts' "responsibility for the administration of jus-
tice would be frustrated were it unable to enlist or require the services of those
who have, by virtue of their license, a monopoly on the provision of such ser-
vices. Attorneys who have a privilege of practicing before the court have a cor-
relative obligation to be available to serve the court."'170 Even though Accetturo
was a criminal case, the court's focus was not on the litigant's constitutional
right to counsel, but on the "symbiotic relationship between the court and the
attorneys who are members of the bar.' 7'1 It is only by maintaining the integ-
rity of this relationship that the courts can ensure that fairness will define the
adversarial process. In either a criminal or civil dispute, the same goals of fair-
ness to the litigant and the proper resolution of the controversy trigger the
court's authority to require the services of counsel. Thus the court's inherent
authority cannot be circumscribed according to the nature of the dispute before
it, but exists independent of such labels, and applies by necessity to all cases
where fairness is threatened. 1 2
While the Supreme Court has never addressed the relationship between the
courts' inherent powers, and the power conferred upon it by Section 1915(d),
the Fourth Circuit has taken this step. In Bowman v. White, the Fourth Circuit
held that Section 1915(d) "is merely descriptive of the court's inherent
power."173 Thus, it is clear that Section 1915(d) does not operate as a constraint
on that power, but as the majority in Mallard so readily pointed out, it "simply
codifies existing rights and powers."11 4 It is unlikely that Congress, if it was
merely codifying the existing powers of the federal judiciary, meant to exclude
its inherent authority over the bar.
Even if it were assumed that the federal courts did not possess inherent
authority to control the proceeding before it by appointing counsel to indigent
litigants, it must be acknowledged that the district courts have the discretion to
adopt local rules that are necessary to carry out the conduct of its business. 75
169. See Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985). In Piper, Justice Powell reasoned
that "a nonresident bar member, like the resident member, could be required to represent indigents and perhaps to
participate in formal legal aid work." Id. at 287. See also People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470-71,
162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928); Tyler v. Lark, 472 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1972) (inherent power to do that necessary to
administer justice).
170. United States v. Accetturo, 842 F.2d 1408, 1413 (3d Cir. 1988).
171. Id.
172. People ex reL Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928) (cooperation is due whenever
justice would be imperilled if withheld).
173. Bowman v. White, 388 F.2d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1968).
174. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1821 (1989).
175. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1654, 2071 (1984). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 83, which states:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time to time... make and
amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules.. . . Copies of rules and amendments
so made by any district court shall upon their promulgation be furnished to the. . . [Supreme Court of
the United States]. In all cases not provided for by rules, the district [courts] . . . may regulate their
practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules.
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This authority includes the regulation of admissions to its own bar, and the
ability to control the practice of counsel in order to ensure the proliferation of
"principles of right and justice."'17
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure found
that the regional courts must be given the authority to fill in the interstices in
the Federal Rules, depending on each court's individual needs. Local rules have
been viewed as essential tools in implementing court policy in administrative
matters. Courts differ from most organizations in that they rely heavily on out-
siders, especially the bar, in their operations. Particularly in matters affecting
the management of case flow, the court's policies directly involve the lawyers
who practice before it.177 Pursuant to its discretion under Rule 83, and upon a
directive from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, ' 7  the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Iowa implemented the Volunteer Law-
yers Project, whereby the clerk of court was ordered to prepare a list of attor-
neys from which appointments were to be made in pro bono cases under Section
1915(d). Such a rule, based on the court's concern that there were an insuffi-
cient number of attorneys willing to serve in pro bono cases, and that many
judges were reluctant to request lawyers to appear, was promulgated to solve a
problem left unanswered by the Federal Rules. This was the precise type of ad
hoc rule-making which the framers of Rule 83 envisioned. Viewed apart from
the intricacies associated with the Mallard case and Section 1915(d) in general,
the Iowa court's response to the problem of representation seems to be "in ac-
cordance with general principles of justice and common sense."' 79 Given the
broad discretion accorded to the district courts in the exercise of rule-making,
and the substantial deference given those rules by the Supreme Court, 8" Mal-
lard's appointment under the Volunteer Lawyers Project should have been up-
held by the Supreme Court.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because of the significant questions left unanswered by the Supreme Court
in Mallard, the Court will most assuredly revisit the issue of the scope of a
court's power to appoint counsel in civil cases in the near future. Even though
the Court refused to construe the statute in the context of the history behind the
Id.
176. Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 645 (1987); see also In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 554 (1968) (White,
J., concurring) (citation omitted).
177. Flanders, Local Rules in Federal District Courts: Usurpation, Legislation, or Information? 14 Loy.
LAL. REv. 213, 218-19 (1981).
178. Nelson v. Redfield Lithograph Printing, 728 F.2d 1003 (8th Cir. 1984).
179. Note, Rule 83 and the Local Federal Rules, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1251, 1253-55 (1967) (quoting A.B.A.,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Proceedings of the Institute at Washington and of the Symposium at New
York City 28, 129 (1938).
180. Frazier, 482 U.S. at 654 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (1987). In his dissent to Frazier, Chief Justice
Rehnquist outlined the standards to be applied to Supreme Court review of local rules. In order for a local rule to
be overturned, the Court must find (1) the rule conflicts with an act of Congress; (2) the rule is contrary to a rule
of procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court; (3) the rule is constitutionally infirm; or (4) the subject matter
of the rule is not within the power of a lower federal court to regulate. Id. Applying these standards to the rule at
issue in Mallard, it is certain that, if applied, it would meet the strictures of the Frazier test.
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Act, the courts' inherent authority, or the lawyers' ethical obligations, it appears
prepared to address those issues. At that time the courts, if not through Section
1915(d) itself, will undoubtedly be given the authority to remedy the problem
Congress thought it had resolved in 1892.
James J. Vinch

